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Can they suffer?
Commentary on Chapman & Huffman on Human Difference
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Abstract: We should treat sentient nonhuman animals as worthy of moral consideration, not
because we share an evolutionary history with them, but because they can suffer. As Chapman &
Huffman (2018) argue, humans are not uniquely disconnected from other species. We should
minimize the suffering we inflict on sentient beings — whether human or nonhuman — not
because they, too, are tool-makers or have sophisticated communication systems, but because
they, too, can suffer, and suffering is bad.
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Evolution by natural selection is a fact as sure as gravity. As Chapman & Huffman (2018) (C & H)
argue, this means that humans are not uniquely disconnected from other species. But, in contrast
to the argument presented by C & H, I think this is not relevant to why we should treat nonhuman
animals as we treat those humans we care about (and as we should treat all humans). Whether
we share a particular trait (e.g., tool-making) is not relevant to whether we should treat sentient
nonhuman animals as worthy of moral consideration. As Bentham (1789) spelled out over two
centuries ago:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never
could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a human being should be abandoned without
redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised that the number of
the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the
insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown
horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than
an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what
would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer.

To a first approximation, any living being with a brain can suffer and, therefore, warrants moral
consideration. Whether these beings were poofed into existence by a god or gods is not relevant
— it matters not whether we share an evolutionary history with them (of course, I recognize that
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we do). We should behave so as to minimize the suffering we inflict on sentient beings — whether
human or nonhuman — not because they, too, are tool-makers; not because they, too, have
sophisticated communication systems. We should minimize suffering because suffering is bad.
We should not farm sentient animals like cows, chickens, and pigs, for example, for the same
reason that we should not farm humans: Because farming them inflicts unnecessary suffering on
them. I certainly agree with the conclusion of the arguments presented by C & H. But I think it is
not relevant whether and to what degree we share a particular trait — with one exception. The
only trait that matters — the only morally considerable trait — is sentience. We should work hard
to minimize the suffering we inflict on sentient life. It is irrelevant whether that sentient life is
human or nonhuman.
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